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Abstract
Multi-unit auctions are a paradigmatic model, where a seller brings multiple units of a good,
while several buyers bring monetary endowments. It is well known that Walrasian equilibria
do not always exist in this model, however compelling relaxations such as Walrasian envy-free
pricing do. In this paper we design an optimal envy-free mechanism for multi-unit auctions
with budgets. When the market is even mildly competitive, the approximation ratios of this
mechanism are small constants for both the revenue and welfare objectives, and in fact for
welfare the approximation converges to 1 as the market becomes fully competitive. We also
give an impossibility theorem, showing that truthfulness requires discarding resources and, in
particular, is incompatible with (Pareto) efficiency.
1 Introduction
Auctions are procedures for allocating goods that have been studied in economics in the 20th
century, and which are even more relevant now due to the emergence of online platforms. Major
companies such as Google and Facebook make most of their revenue through auctions, while an
increasing number of governments around the world use spectrum auctions to allocate licenses
for electromagnetic spectrum to companies. These transactions involve hundreds or thousands of
participants with complex preferences, reason for which auctions require more careful design and
their study has resurfaced in the computer science literature.
In this paper we study a paradigmatic model known as multi-unit auctions with budgets, in
which a seller brings multiple units of a good (e.g. apples), while the buyers bring money and
have interests in consuming the goods. Multi-unit auctions have been studied in a large body
of literature due to the importance of the model, which already illustrates complex phenomena
[DLN12, BCI+05, DN07, DL14, DN15].
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The main requirements from a good auction mechanism are usually computational efficiency,
revenue maximization for the seller, and simplicity of use for the participants, the latter of which
is captured through the notion of truthfulness. An important property that is often missing from
auction design is fairness, and in fact for the purpose of maximizing revenue it is useful to impose
higher payments to the buyers that are more interested in the goods. However, there are studies
showing that customers are unhappy with such discriminatory prices (see, e.g., [AS08]), which has
lead to a body of literature focused on achieving fair pricing [GHK+05, FFLS12, CAEFF16, FGL15,
Sek17].
A remarkable solution concept that has been used for achieving fairness in auctions comes from
free markets, which are economic systems where the prices and allocations are not designed by a
central authority. Instead, the prices emerge through a process of adjusting demand and supply
such that everyone faces the same prices and the buyers freely purchase the bundles they are most
interested in. When the goods are divisible, an outcome where supply and demand are perfectly
balanced—known as competitive (or Walrasian) equilibrium [Wal74] —always exists under mild
assumptions on the utilities and has the property that the participants face the same prices and can
freely acquire their favorite bundle at those prices. The competitive equilibrium models outcomes
of large economies, where the goods are divisible and the participants so small (infinitesimal)
that they have no influence on the market beyond purchasing their most preferred bundle at the
current prices. Unfortunately, when the goods are indivisible, the competitive equilibrium does not
necessarily exist (except for small classes of valuations see, e.g., [KC82, GS99]) and the induced
mechanism – the Walrasian mechanism [BLNPL14, CS08] – is generally manipulable.
A solution for recovering the attractive properties of the Walrasian equilibrium in the multi-
unit model is to relax the clearing requirement of the market equilibrium, by allowing the seller to
not sell all of the units. This solution is known as (Walrasian) envy-free pricing [GHK+05], and it
ensures that all the participants of the market face the same prices1, and each one purchases their
favorite bundle of goods. An envy-free pricing trivially exists by pricing the goods infinitely high,
so the challenge is finding one with good guarantees, such as high revenue for the seller or high
welfare for the participants.
We would like to obtain envy-free pricing mechanisms that work well with strategic participants,
who may alter their inputs to the mechanism to get better outcomes. To this end, we design an
optimal truthful and envy-free mechanism for multi-unit auctions with budgets, with high revenue
and welfare in competitive environments. Our work can be viewed as part of a general research
agenda of simplicity in mechanism design [HR09], which recently proposed item pricing [BBM08,
FGL15] as a way of designing simpler auctions while at the same time avoiding the ill effects of
discriminatory pricing [FFLS12, AS08]. Item pricing is used in practice all over the world to sell
goods in supermarkets or online platforms such as Amazon, which provides a strong motivation for
understanding it theoretically.
1.1 Model and Results
Our model is a multi-unit auction with budgets, in which a seller owns m identical units of an item.
Each buyer i has a budget Bi and a value vi per unit. The utilities of the buyers are quasi-linear
up to the budget cap, while any allocation that exceeds that cap is unfeasible.
1The term envy-free pricing has also been used when the pricing is per-bundle, not per-item. We adopt the original
definition of [GHK+05] which applies to unit-pricing, due to its attractive fairness properties [FFLS12].
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We deal with the problem of designing envy-free pricing schemes for the strongest concept of
incentive compatibility, namely dominant strategy truthfulness. The truthful mechanisms are in
the prior-free setting, i.e. they do not require any prior distribution assumptions. We evaluate the
efficiency of mechanisms using the notion of market share, s∗, which captures the maximum buying
power of any individual buyer in the market. Our main contributions can be summarized as follows.
Main Theorem (informal) For linear multi-unit auctions with known monetary endowments:
• There exists no (Walrasian) envy-free mechanism that is both truthful and non-wasteful.
• There exists a truthful (Walrasian) envy-free auction, which attains a fraction of at least
max
{
2, 11−s∗
}
of the optimal revenue and at least 1−s∗ of the optimal welfare on any market,
where 0 < s∗ < 1 is the market share. This mechanism is optimal for both the revenue
and welfare objectives when the market is even mildly competitive (i.e. with market share
s∗ ≤ 50%), and its approximation for welfare converges to 1 as the market becomes fully
competitive.
In the statement above, optimal means that there is no other truthful envy-free auction mecha-
nism with a better approximation ratio. A mechanism is non-wasteful if it allocates as many units
as possible at a given price. The impossibility theorem implies in particular that truthfulness is in-
compatible with Pareto efficiency. Our positive results are for known budgets, similarly to [DLN12].
In the economics literature budgets are viewed as hard information (quantitative), as opposed to
the valuations, which represent soft information and are more difficult to verify (see, e.g., [Pet04]).
We also provide several computational results: a polynomial time algorithm for computing
a welfare maximizing envy-free pricing, and an FPTAS and an exact algorithm (which runs in
polynomial-time for a constant number of types of buyers) for computing a revenue-maximizing
envy-free pricing (Theorem 11 and 12 in the appendix). Our FPTAS for revenue improves upon
the results in [FFLS12], which had previously provided a 2-approximation algorithm.
Finally, in the general multi-unit model, we show hardness of maximizing welfare and revenue
and provide an FPTAS for both objectives (Theorem 14 and 15 in the appendix).
1.2 Related Work
The multi-unit setting has been studied in a large body of literature on auctions ([DLN12, BCI+05,
DN07, DL14, DN15]), where the focus has been on designing truthful auctions with good approxi-
mations to some desired objective, such as the social welfare or the revenue. Quite relevant to ours
is the paper by [DLN12], in which the authors study multi-unit auctions with budgets, however
with no restriction to envy-free pricing or even item-pricing. They design a truthful auction (that
uses discriminatory pricing) for known budgets, that achieves near-optimal revenue guarantees when
the influence of each buyer in the auction is bounded, using a notion of buyer dominance, which
is conceptually close to the market share notion that we employ. Their mechanism is based on the
concept of clinching auctions [Aus04].
Attempts at good prior-free truthful mechanisms for multi-unit auctions are seemingly impaired
by their general impossibility result which states that truthfulness and efficiency are essentially
incompatible when the budgets are private. Our general impossibility result is very similar in
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nature, but it is not implied by the results in [DLN12] for the following two reasons: (a) our
impossibility holds for known budgets and (b) our notion of efficiency is weaker, as it is naturally
defined with respect to envy-free allocations only. This also means that our impossibility theorem
is not implied by their uniqueness result, even for two buyers. Multi-unit auctions with budgets
have also been considered in [DL14] and [BCI+05], and without budgets ([DN15, BGN03, DN07]);
all of the aforementioned papers do not consider the envy-freeness constraint.
The effects of strategizing in markets have been studied extensively over the past few years
([BLS16, BCD+14, CDZ11, MS13, MTVV14]). For more general envy-free auctions, besides the
multi-unit case, there has been some work on truthful mechanisms in the literature of envy-free
auctions ([GHK+05]) and ([HY11]) for pair envy-freeness, a different notion which dictates that no
buyer would want to swap its allocation with that of any other buyer [MT16]. It is worth noticing
that there is a body of literature that considers envy-free pricing as a purely optimization problem
(with no regard to incentives) and provides approximation algorithms and hardness results for
maximizing revenue and welfare in different auction settings [FFLS12, CBLSZ14].
It is worth mentioning that the good approximations achieved by our truthful mechanism are a
prior-free setting ([Har13]), i.e. we don’t require any assumptions on prior distributions from which
the input valuations are drawn. Good prior-free approximations are usually difficult to achieve and
a large part of the literature is concerned with auctions under distributional assumptions, under
the umbrella of Bayesian mechanism design ([DW17, CFH+17, DHP17, CDW12, CDW13, Har13,
Mye81]).
2 Preliminaries
In a linear multi-unit auction with budgets there is a set of buyers, denoted by N = {1, . . . , n},
and a single seller with m indivisible units of a good for sale. Each buyer i has a valuation vi > 0
and a budget Bi > 0, both drawn from a discrete domain V of rational numbers: vi, Bi ∈ V. The
valuation vi indicates the value of the buyer for one unit of the good.
An allocation is an assignment of units to the buyers denoted by a vector x = (x1, . . . , xn)
∈ Zn+, where xi is the number of units received by buyer i. We are interested in feasible allocations,
for which:
∑n
i=1 xi ≤ m.
The seller will set a price p per unit, such that the price of purchasing ℓ units is p · ℓ for any
buyer. The interests of the buyers at a given price are captured by the demand function.
Definition 1 (Demand) The demand of buyer i at a price p is a set consisting of all the possible
bundle sizes (number of units) that the buyer would like to purchase at this price:
Di(p) =


min{⌊Bip ⌋,m}, if p < vi
0, . . . ,min{⌊Bip ⌋,m}, if p = vi
0, otherwise.
If a buyer is indifferent between buying and not buying at a price, then its demand is a set of
all the possible bundles that it can afford, based on its budget constraint.
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Definition 2 (Utility) The utility of buyer i given a price p and an allocation x is
ui(p, xi) =
{
vi · xi − p · xi, if p · xi ≤ Bi
−∞, otherwise
(Walrasian) Envy-free Pricing. An allocation and price (x, p) represent a (Walrasian) envy-free
pricing if each buyer is allocated a number of units in its demand set at price p, i.e. xi ∈ Di(p)
for all i ∈ N . A price p is an envy-free price if there exists an allocation x such that (x, p) is an
envy-free pricing.
While an envy-free pricing always exists (just set p = ∞), it is not always possible to sell all
the units in an envy-free way. We illustrate this through an example.
Example 1 (Non-existence of envy-free clearing prices) Let N = {1, 2}, m = 3, valuations
v1 = v2 = 1.1, and B1 = B2 = 1. At any price p > 0.5, no more than 2 units can be sold in total
because of budget constraints. At p ≤ 0.5, both buyers are interested and demand at least 2 units
each, but there are only 3 units in total.
Objectives. We are interested in maximizing the social welfare and revenue objectives attained
at envy-free pricing. The social welfare at an envy-free pricing (x, p) is the total value of the
buyers for the goods allocated, while the revenue is the total payment received by the seller, i.e.
SW(x, p) =
∑n
i=1 vi · xi and REV(x, p) =
∑n
i=1 xi · p.
Mechanisms. The goal of the seller will be to obtain money in exchange for the goods, however,
it can only do that if the buyers are interested in purchasing them. The problem of the seller will
be to obtain accurate information about the preferences of the buyers that would allow optimizing
the pricing. Since the inputs (valuations) of the buyers are private, we will aim to design auction
mechanisms that incentivize the buyers to reveal their true preferences [NRTV07].
An auction mechanism is a function M : Vn → O × Zn+ that maps the valuations reported
by the buyers to a price p ∈ O, where O is the space from which the prices are drawn2, and an
allocation vector x ∈ Zn+.
Definition 3 (Truthful Mechanism) A mechanism M is truthful if it incentivizes the buyers
to reveal their true inputs, i.e. ui(M(v)) ≥ ui(M(v
′
i, v−i)), for all i ∈ N , any alternative report
v′i ∈ V of buyer i and any vector of reports v−i of all the other buyers.
Requiring incentive compatibility from a mechanism can lead to worse revenue, so our goal
will be to design mechanisms that achieve revenue close to that attained in the pure optimization
problem (of finding a revenue optimal envy-free pricing without incentive constraints).
Types of Buyers. The next definitions will be used extensively in the paper. Buyer i is said to
be hungry at price p if vi > p and semi-hungry if vi = p. Given an allocation x and a price p buyer
i is essentially hungry if it is either semi-hungry with xi = min{⌊Bi/p⌋,m} or hungry. In other
words, a buyer is essentially hungry if its value per unit is at least as high as the price per unit
and, moreover, the buyer receives the largest non-zero element in its demand set.
The following lemmas will be useful.
2In principle the spaces V and O can be the same but for the purpose of getting good revenue and welfare, it is
useful to have the price to be drawn from a slightly larger domain; see Section 3.
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Lemma 1 Let p be an envy-free price. Then any price p′ > p is also envy-free. Similarly, if p is
not an envy-free price, then any price p′ < p is not envy-free either.
Proof: This follows from the fact that for every buyer i, the number of demanded units is non-
increasing in the price. If at price p there are enough units to satisfy all demands, then the same
holds at any price p′ > p. Similarly, if at some price p there are not enough units to satisfy all
demands, this is also the case for any p′ < p. 
For both revenue and welfare, the optimal solution can be found in a set of candidate prices:
P =
{
vi,
Bi
k
| ∀i ∈ N,∀k ∈ [m]
}
.
These prices are either equal to some valuation or have the property that some buyer could exhaust
its budget by purchasing all the units it can afford.
Lemma 2 For both the revenue and social welfare objectives, there is an optimal envy-free price
p ∈ P.
Proof: Let p′ be a welfare maximizing envy-free price and let x be the corresponding allocation.
If p′ ∈ P then we are done. Else, assume p′ 6= P. Then, we can increase the price p′ until some
budget Bi is exhausted or the price becomes equal to some valuation vi. Until that happens, the
demand sets of all buyers remain constant and hence the exact same allocation x can be supported
at some price p ∈ P. Since the social welfare only depends on the allocation and not the price, the
conclusion follows. The proof for revenue follows from the observation that increasing the price is
beneficial for the seller as long as it continues to sell the same number of items. The discontinuities
only happen at points where the price matches the valuation at some buyer (and so increasing
the price above that value can result in losing the buyer) or when the number of items decreases
because a buyer can no longer afford to purchase as many units. 
Lemma 3 For a linear multi-unit market, given an envy-free price p, a revenue or welfare maxi-
mizing allocation at p can be found in polynomial time in n and log(m).
Proof: First, given the valuation functions of the hungry buyers, we can compute their demands
at price p. Note these demands are singletons and so the allocation for these buyers is uniquely
determined. For the non-hungry buyers (if any), we assign the remaining units (if any) in a greedy
fashion: Fix an arbitrary order of buyers and assign them units according to that order, until all of
them exhaust their budgets or we run out of units. All these operations can be done in polynomial
time. 
3 An optimal envy-free and truthful mechanism
In this section, we present our main contribution, an envy-free and truthful mechanism, which is
optimal among all truthful mechanisms and achieves small constant approximations to the optimal
welfare and revenue. The approximation guarantees are with respect to the market-share s∗, which
intuitively captures the maximum purchasing power of any individual buyer in the auction. The
formal definition is postponed to the corresponding subsection.
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Theorem 1 There exists a truthful (Walrasian) envy-free auction, which attains a fraction of at
least
• max
{
2, 11−s∗
}
of the optimal revenue, and
• 1− s∗ of the optimal welfare
on any market. This mechanism is optimal for both the revenue and welfare objectives when the
market is even mildly competitive (i.e. with market share s∗ ≤ 50%), and its approximation for
welfare converges to 1 as the auction becomes fully competitive.
Consider the following mechanism.
All-or-Nothing:
Given as input the valuations of the buyers, let p be the minimum envy-free
price and x the allocation obtained as follows:
• For every hungry buyer i, set xi to its demand.
• For every buyer i with vi < p, set xi = 0.
• For every semi-hungry buyer i, set xi = ⌊Bi/p⌋ if possible, otherwise
set xi = 0 taking the semi-hungry buyers in lexicographic order.
In other words, the mechanism always outputs the minimum envy-free price but if there are semi-
hungry buyers at that price, they get either all the units they can afford at this price or 0, even if
there are still available units, after satisfying the demands of the hungry buyers.
Lemma 4 The minimum envy-free price does not exist when the price domain is R.
Proof: If the price can be any real number, consider an auction with n = 2 buyers, m = 2 units,
valuations v1 = v2 = 3 and budgets B1 = B2 = 2. At any price p ≤ 1, there is overdemand since
each buyer is hungry and demands at least 2 units, while there are only 2 units in total. At any
price p ∈ (1, 2], each buyer demands at most one unit due to budget constraints, and so all the
prices in the range (1, 2] are envy-free. This is an open set, and so there is no minimum envy-free
price. Note however, that by making the output domain discrete, e.g. with 0.1 increments starting
from zero, then the minimum envy-free price output is 1.01. At this price each buyer purchases 1
unit. 
Given the example above, we will consider the discrete domain V as an infinite grid with entries
of the form k · ǫ, for k ∈ N and some sufficiently small3 ǫ. For the output of the mechanism, we will
assume a slightly finer grid, e.g. with entries k ·δ = k(ǫ/2), for k ∈ N. The minimum envy-free price
3For most of our results, any discrete domain is sufficient for the results to hold; for some results we will need to
a number of grid points that polynomial in the size of the input grid.
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can be found in time which is polynomial in the input and log(1/ǫ), using binary search4 and the
mechanism is optimal with respect to discrete domain that we operate on. Operating on a grid is
actually without loss of generality in terms of the objectives; even if we compare to the optimal on
the continuous domain, if our discretization is fine enough, we don’t lose any revenue or welfare.
Lemma 5 When the valuation and budget of each buyer are drawn from a discrete grid with entries
k · ǫ, and the price is is drawn from a finer grid with entries k · ǫ/2, for k ∈ N, then the welfare and
revenue loss of the All-or-Nothing mechanism due to the discretization of the output domain is
zero. The mechanism always runs in time polynomial in the input and log(1/ǫ).
Truthfulness of the All-or-Nothing Mechanism
The following theorem establishes the truthfulness of All-or-Nothing.
Theorem 2 The All-or-Nothing mechanism is truthful.
Proof: First, we will prove the following statement. If p is any envy-free price and p′ is an envy-
free price such that p ≤ p′ then the utility of any essentially hungry buyer i at price p is at least as
large as its utility at price p′. The case when p′ = p is trivial, since the price (and the allocation)
do not change. Consider the case when p < p′. Since p is an envy-free price, buyer i receives the
maximum number of items in its demand. For a higher price p′, its demand will be at most as large
as its demand at price p and hence its utility at p′ will be at most as large as its utility at p.
Assume now for contradiction that Mechanism All-or-Nothing is not truthful and let i be
a deviating buyer who benefits by misreporting its valuation vi as v
′
i at some valuation profile
v = (v1, . . . , vn), for which the minimum envy-free price is p. Let p
′ be the new minimum envy
free price and let x and x′ be the corresponding allocations at p and p′ respectively, according to
All-or-Nothing. Let v′ = (v′i, v−i) be the valuation profile after the deviation.
We start by arguing that the deviating buyer i is essentially hungry. First, assume for contra-
diction that i is neither hungry nor semi-hungry, which means that vi < p. Clearly, if p
′ ≥ p, then
buyer i does not receive any units at p′ and there is no incentive for manipulation; thus we must
have that p′ < p. This implies that every buyer j such that xj > 0 at price p is hungry at price p
′
and hence x′j ≥ xj. Since the demand of all players does not decrease at p
′, this implies that p′ is
also an envy-free price on instance v, contradicting minimality of p.
Next, assume that buyer i is semi-hungry but not essentially hungry, which means that vi = p
and xi = 0, by the allocation of the mechanism. Again, in order for the buyer to benefit, it has
to hold that p′ < p and x′i > 0 which implies that x
′
i = ⌊Bi/p
′ ⌋, i.e. buyer i receives the largest
element in its demand set at price p′. But then, since p′ < p and p′ is an envy-free price, buyer i
could receive ⌊Bi/p⌋ units at price p without violating the envy-freeness of p, in contradiction with
each buyer i being essentially hungry at p.
From the previous two paragraphs, the deviating buyer must be essentially hungry. This means
that xi > 0 and vi ≥ p. By the discussion in the first paragraph of the proof, we have p
′ < p. Since
xi > 0, the buyer does not benefit from reporting v
′
i such that v
′
i < p
′. Thus it suffices to consider
the case when v′i ≥ p
′. We have two subcases:
4In the full version, we describe a faster procedure that finds the minimum envy-free without requiring to do
binary search over the grid.
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• v′i > p: Buyer i is essentially hungry at price p according to vi and hungry at price p
′ according
to v′i. The reports of the other buyers are fixed and Bi is known; similarly to above, price p
′
is an envy-free price on instance v, contradicting the minimality of p.
• v′i = p
′: Intuitively, an essentially hungry buyer at price p is misreporting its valuation as be-
ing lower trying to achieve an envy-free price p′ equal to the reported valuation. Since v′i = p
′,
Mechanism All-or-Nothing gives the buyer either as many units as it can afford at this
price or zero units. In the first case, since p′ is envy-free and Bi is known, buyer i at price p
′
receives the largest element in its demand set and since the valuations of all other buyers are
fixed, p′ is also an envy-free price on input v, contradicting the minimality of p. In the sec-
ond case, the buyer does not receive any units and hence it does not benefit from misreporting.
Thus there are no improving deviations, which concludes the proof of the theorem. 
Performance of the All-or-Nothing Mechanism
Next, we show that the mechanism has a good performance for both objectives. We measure the
performance of a truthful mechanism by the standard notion of approximation ratio, i.e.
ratio(M) = sup
v∈Rn
maxx,pOBJ (v)
OBJ (M(v))
,
where OBJ ∈ {SW,REV} is either the social welfare or the revenue objective. Obviously, a
mechanism that outputs a pair that maximizes the objectives has approximation ratio 1. The goal
is to construct truthful mechanisms with approximation ratio as close to 1 as possible.
We remark here that for the approximation ratios, we only need to consider valuation profiles
that are not “trivial”, i.e. input profiles for which at any envy-free price, no hungry or semi-hungry
buyers can afford a single unit and hence the envy-free price can be anything; on trivial profiles,
both the optimal price and allocation and the price and allocation output by Mechanism All-or-
Nothing obtain zero social welfare or zero revenue.
Market Share A well-known notion for measuring the competitiveness of a market is the market
share, understood as the percentage of the market accounted for by a specific entity (see, e.g.,
[FBPR10], Chapter 2).
In our model, the maximum purchasing power (i.e. number of units) of any buyer in the auction
occurs at the minimum envy-free price, pmin. By the definition of the demand, there are many ways
of allocating the semi-hungry buyers, so when measuring the purchasing power of an individual
buyer we consider the maximum number of units that buyer can receive, taken over the set of all
feasible maximal allocations at pmin. Let this set be X . Then the market share of buyer i can be
defined as:
si = max
x∈X
(
xi∑n
k=1 xk
)
.
Then, the market share is defined as s∗ = maxni=1 si. Roughly speaking, a market share s
∗ ≤ 1/2
means that a buyer can never purchase more than half of the resources.
Theorem 3 The All-or-Nothing mechanism approximates the optimal revenue within a factor
of 2 whenever the market share, s∗, is at most 50%.
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Proof: LetOPT be the optimal revenue, attained at some price p∗ and allocation x, andREV(AON)
the revenue attained by theAll-or-Nothingmechanism. By definition, mechanismAll-or-Nothing
outputs the minimum envy-free price pmin, together with an allocation z. For ease of exposition,
let αi = Bi/pmin and α
∗
i = Bi/p
∗, ∀i ∈ N . There are two cases, depending on whether the optimal
envy-free price, p∗, is equal to the minimum envy-free price, pmin:
Case 1 : p∗ > pmin. Denote by L the set of buyers with valuations at least p
∗ that can afford at least
one unit at the optimal price. Note that the set of buyers that get allocated at pmin is a superset of
L. Moreover, the optimal revenue is bounded by the revenue attained at the (possibly infeasible)
allocation where all the buyers in L get the maximum number of units in their demand. These
observations give the next inequalities:
REV(AON) ≥
∑
i∈L
⌊αi⌋ · pmin and OPT ≤
∑
i∈L
⌊α∗i ⌋ · p
∗.
Then the revenue is bounded by:
REV(AON)
OPT
≥
∑
i∈L ⌊αi⌋ · pmin∑
i∈L ⌊α
∗
i ⌋ · p
∗
≥
∑
i∈L ⌊αi⌋ · pmin∑
i∈L α
∗
i · p
∗
=
∑
i∈L ⌊αi⌋ · pmin∑
i∈LBi
=
∑
i∈L ⌊αi⌋∑
i∈L αi
≥
∑
i∈L ⌊αi⌋∑
i∈L 2 ⌊αi⌋
=
1
2
,
where we used that the auction is non-trivial, i.e. for any buyer i ∈ L, ⌊αi⌋ ≥ 1, and so αi ≤
⌊αi⌋+ 1 ≤ 2 ⌊αi⌋.
Case 2 : p∗ = pmin. The hungry buyers at pmin, as well as the buyers with valuations below pmin,
receive identical allocations under All-or-Nothing and the optimal allocation, x. However there
are multiple ways of assigning the semi-hungry buyers to achieve an optimal allocation. Recall that
z is the allocation made by All-or-Nothing. Without loss of generality, we can assume that x
is an optimal allocation with the property that x is a superset of z and the following condition holds:
• the number of buyers not allocated under z, but that are allocated under x, is minimized.
We argue that x allocates at most one buyer more compared to z. Assume by contradiction that
there are at least two semi-hungry buyers i and j, such that 0 < xi < ⌊αi⌋ and 0 < xj < ⌊αj⌋.
Then we can progressively take units from buyer j and transfer them to buyer i, until either buyer
i receives x′i = ⌊αi⌋, or buyer j receives x
′
j = 0. Hence we can assume that the set of semi-hungry
buyers that receive non-zero, non-maximal allocations in the optimal solution x is either empty
or a singleton. If the set is empty, then All-or-Nothing is optimal. Otherwise, let the singleton
be ℓ; denote by x˜ℓ the maximum number of units that ℓ can receive in any envy-free allocation at
pmin. Since the number of units allocated by any maximal envy-free allocation at pmin is equal to∑n
i=1 xi, but xℓ ≤ x˜ℓ, we get:
xℓ∑n
i=1 xi
≤
x˜ℓ∑n
i=1 xi
= s∗i .
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Thus
REV(AON)
OPT
=
OPT − xℓ · pmin
OPT
≥
OPT − x˜ℓ · pmin
OPT
= 1−
x˜ℓ · pmin∑n
i=1 xi · pmin
= 1−
x˜ℓ∑n
i=1 xi
= 1− s∗i ≥ 1− s
∗
Combining the two cases, the bound follows. This completes the proof. 
Corollary 1 The performance of the All-or-Nothing mechanism is max{2, 1/(1 − s∗) on any
market (i.e. with market share 0 < s∗ < 1).
Proof: From the proof of Theorem 3, since the arguments of Case 1 do not use the market share
s∗, it follows that the ratio of All-Or-Nothing for the revenue objective can alternatively be
stated as max{2, 1/(1 − s∗)} and therefore it degrades gracefully with the increase in the market
share. 
The next theorem establishes that the approximation ratio for welfare is also constant.
Theorem 4 The approximation ratio of Mechanism All-or-Nothing with respect to the social
welfare is at most 1/(1 − s∗), where the market share s∗ ∈ (0, 1). The approximation ratio goes to
1 as the market becomes fully competitive.
Proof: For social welfare we have, similarly to Theorem 3, that
SW(AON)
OPT
=
OPT − xℓ · vℓ
OPT
≥
OPT − x˜ℓ · vℓ
OPT
= 1−
x˜ℓ · vℓ∑n
i=1 xi · vi
≥ 1−
x˜ℓ · vℓ∑n
i=1 xi · vℓ
= 1−
x˜ℓ∑n
i=1 xi
= 1− s∗i ≥ 1− s
∗,
where OPT is now the optimal welfare, x the corresponding allocation at OPT , and we used the
fact that vℓ ≤ vi for all i ∈ L. 
Finally, All-or-Nothing is optimal among all truthful mechanisms for both objectives when-
ever the market share s∗ is at most 1/2.
Theorem 5 Let M be any truthful mechanism that always outputs an envy-free pricing scheme.
Then the approximation ratio of M for the revenue and the welfare objective is at least 2− 4m+2 .
Proof: Consider an auction with equal budgets, B, and valuation profile v. Assume that buyer
1 has the highest valuation, v1, buyer 2 the second highest valuation v2, with the property that
v1 > v2+ǫ, where ǫ is set later. Let vi < v2 for all buyers i = 3, 4, . . . , n. Set B such that ⌊
B
v2
⌋ = m2 +1
and ǫ such that ⌊ Bv2+ǫ⌋ =
m
2 . Informally, the buyers can afford
m
2 + 1 units at prices v2 and v2 + ǫ.
Note that on this profile, Mechanism All-or-Nothing outputs price v2 and allocates
m
2 +1 units
to buyer 1. For a concrete example of such an auction, take m = 12, v1 = 1.12, v2 = 1.11 (i.e.
ǫ = 0.01) and B = 8 (the example can be extended to any number of units with appropriate scaling
of the parameters).
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Let M be any truthful mechanism, pM its price on this instance, and p
∗ the optimal price (with
respect to the objective in question). The high level idea of the proof, for both objectives, is the
following. We start from the profile v above, where pmin = v2 is the minimum envy-free price, and
argue that if p∗ 6= v2, then the bound follows. Otherwise, p
∗ = v2, case in which we construct a
series of profiles v,v(1),v(2), . . . ,v(k) that only differ from the previous profile in the sequence by
the reported valuation v
(j)
2 of buyer 2. We argue that in each such profile, either the mechanism
allocates units to buyer 1 only, case in which the bound is immediate, or buyer 2 is semi-hungry. In
the latter case, truthfulness and the constraints on the number of units will imply that any truthful
mechanism must allocate to buyer 2 zero items, yielding again the required bound.
First, consider the social welfare objective. Observe that for the optimal price p∗ on profile v,
it holds that p∗ = v2. We have a few subcases:
Case 1 : pM < v2. Then M is not an envy-free mechanism, since in this case there would be
over-demand for units.
Case 2 : pM > v2: Then M allocates units only to buyer 1, achieving a social welfare of at most
(m2 +1)v2. The maximum social welfare is m · v2, so the approximation ratio of M is at least
m
(m/2)+1 = 2−
4
m+2 .
Case 3 : pM = v2: Let x2 be the number of units allocated to buyer 2 at price v2; note that since
buyer 2 is semi-hungry at v2, any number of units up to
m
2 − 1 is a valid allocation. If x2 = 0,
then M allocates units only to buyer 1 at price v2 and for the same reason as in Case 2, the
ratio is greater than or equal to 2− 4m+2 ; so we can assume x2 ≥ 1.
Next, consider valuation profile v(1) where for each buyer i 6= 2, we have v
(1)
i = vi, while for
buyer 2, v2 < v
(1)
2 < v2 + ǫ. By definition of B, the minimum envy-free price on v
(1) is v
(1)
2 .
Let p
(1)
M be the price output by M on valuation profile v
(1) and take a few subcases:
a). p
(1)
M > v
(1)
2 : Then using the same argument as in Case 2, the approximation is at
least 2− 4m+2 .
b). p
(1)
M < v
(1)
2 : This cannot happen because by definition of the budgets, v
(1)
2 is the
minimum envy-free price.
c). p
(1)
M = v
(1)
2 : Let x
(1)
2 be the number of units allocated to buyer 2 at profile v
(1); we
claim that x
(1)
2 ≥ 2. Otherwise, if x
(1)
2 ≤ 1, then on profile v
(1) buyer 2 would have an
incentive to report v2, which would move the price to v2, giving buyer 2 at least as many
units (at a lower price), contradicting truthfulness.
Consider now a valuation profile v(2), where for each buyer i 6= 2, it holds that v
(2)
i = v
(1)
i = vi
and for buyer 2 it holds that v
(1)
2 < v
(2)
2 < v2 + ǫ. For the same reasons as in Cases a-c, the
behavior of M must be such that:
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• the price output on input v(2) is v
(2)
2 (otherwise M only allocates to buyer 1, and the
bound is immediate), and
• the number of units x
(2)
2 allocated to buyer 2 is at least 3 (otherwise truthfulness
would be violated).
By iterating through all the profiles in the sequence constructed in this manner, we arrive at
a valuation profile v(k) (similarly constructed), where the price is v
(k)
2 and buyer 2 receives
at least m/2 units. However, buyer 1 is still hungry at price v
(k)
2 and should receive at least
m
2 + 1 units, which violates the unit supply constraint. This implies that in the first profile,
v, M must allocate 0 units to buyer 2 (by setting the price to v2 or to something higher
where buyer 2 does not want any units). This implies that the approximation ratio is at least
2− 4m+2 .
For the revenue objective, the argument is exactly the same, but we need to establish that at any
profile v or v(i), i = 1, . . . , k that we construct, the optimal envy-free price is equal to the second
highest reported valuation, i.e. v2 or v
(i)
2 , i = 1, . . . , k respectively. To do that, choose v1 such that
v1 = v2 + δ, where δ > ǫ, but small enough such that ⌊
B
v2+δ
⌋ = ⌊Bv2 ⌋, i.e. any hungry buyer at price
v2 + δ buys the same number of units as it would buy at price v2. Furthermore, ǫ and δ can be
chosen small enough such that (m2 + 1)(v2 + δ) < m · v2, i.e. the revenue obtained by selling
m
2 + 1
units to buyer 1 at price v2+ δ is smaller than the revenue obtained by selling
m
2 +1 units to buyer
1 and m2 − ǫ units to buyer 2 at price v2. This establishes the optimal envy-free price is the same
as before, for every profile in the sequence and all arguments go through.
Given that we are working over a discrete domain, for the proof to go through, it suffices to
assume that there are m points of the domain between v1 and v2, which is easily the case if the
domain is not too sparse. Specifically, for the concrete example presented at the first paragraph of
the proof, assuming that the domain contains all the decimal floating point numbers with up to
two decimal places suffices. 
4 Impossibility Results
In this section, we state our impossibility results, which imply that truthfulness can only be guar-
anteed when there is some kind of wastefulness; a similar observation was made in [BCI+05] for a
different setting.
Theorem 6 There is no Pareto efficient, truthful mechanism that always outputs an envy-free
pricing, even when the budgets are known.
Proof: Assume by contradiction that a Pareto efficient and truthful mechanism that always
outputs an envy-free price exists. Consider the following instance I1 with n = 2 and m = 3 (the
instance can be adapted to work for any number of buyers by adding many buyers with very small
valuations and many items by scaling the budgets appropriately): v1 = v2 = 3 and B1 = B2 = 6.
It is not hard to see that the only Pareto efficient envy-free outcome is to set p = 3 and allocate 2
items to one buyer (wlog buyer 1) and 1 item to the other buyer. Indeed, any price p′ < p would
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not be envy-free and any price p′ > p would sell 0 items, yielding a utility of 0 for both agents
and the auctioneer. At the same time, any allocation that does not allocate all three items at price
p = 3 is Pareto dominated by the above allocation, since the utilities of buyers 1 and 2 would be
0, but the utility of the auctioneer would be smaller.
Now consider a new instance I2 where v1 = 3, v2 = 2.5 (and it still holds that B1 = B2 = 6).
We claim that the only Pareto efficient envy-free outcome (x, q) is to set the price q = 2.5, allocate
x1 = 2 items to buyer 1 and x2 = 1 item to buyer 2. At (x, 2.5), the utility of buyer 1 is u1(x, 2.5) =
6 − 5 = 1, the utility of buyer 2 is u2(x, 2.5) = 2.5 − 2.5 = 0 and the utility of the auctioneer is
ua(x, 2.5) = 2.5 · 3 = 7.5. The only other possible allocation x
′ at price 2.5 would be x′1 = 2 (since
buyer 1 is hungry at price 2.5) and x′2 = 0, which is Pareto dominated by (x, 2.5). Therefore, for
another Pareto efficient pair (x′, q′) to exist, it would have to hold that q′ 6= 2.5.
Obviously, any choice q′ < 2.5 is not envy-free and therefore we only need to consider the case
when q′ > 2.5. At any such price q′, the utility of buyer 1 is at most 1, since the buyer can purchase
x′1 ≤ 2 items at a price strictly higher than 2.5, the utility of buyer 2 is 0 since the price is higher
than its valuation and hence it gets x′2 = 0 items, and finally, the utility of the auctioneer is at
most 6, since it can only sell at most two items at a price no higher than 3. This means that (x′, q′)
is Pareto dominated by (x, 2.5).
The paragraphs above establishes that on Instance I1, buyer 2 receives one item at price 3 and
on instance I2, buyer 2 receives one item at price 2.5. But then, buyer 2 would have an incentive
to misreport his valuation on instance I1 as being v
′
2 = 2.5 and receive the same number of items
at a lower price, thus increasing its utility and contradicting truthfulness.
Since the proof only requires valuations and budgets to lie on points 2.5, 3 and 6, the theorem
also holds for the discrete domain. 
The next theorem provides a stronger impossibility result. First, we provide the necessary
definitions. A buyer i on profile input v is called irrelevant if at the minimum envy-free price p on
v, the buyer can not buy even a single unit. A mechanism is called in-range if it always outputs
an envy-free price in the interval [0, vj ] where vj is the highest valuation among all buyers that are
not irrelevant. Finally, a mechanism is non-wasteful if at a given price p, the mechanism allocates
as many items as possible to the buyers. Note that Pareto efficiency implies in-range and non-
wastefulness, but not the other way around. In a sense, while Pareto efficiency also determines
the price chosen by the mechanism, non-wastefulness only concerns the allocation given a price,
whereas in-range only restricts prices to a “reasonable” interval.
Theorem 7 There is no in-range, non-wasteful and truthful mechanism that always outputs an
envy-free pricing scheme, even when the budgets are known.
Lemma 6 Let M be an in-range, non-wasteful and truthful mechanism. Then on any valuation
profile v which is not trivial, M must output a price p ∈ {pmin, pmin + γ}, where pmin = min{p ∈
O : p is envy-free on v} and γ is the distance between two consecutive elements of O.
Proof: Assume by contradiction that M does not always output a price p ∈ {pmin, pmin+ γ}. Let
v = (v1, . . . , vn) be any valuation profile that is not trivial and let pv be the price outputted by M ;
by assumption, it holds that pv > pmin + γ. By the assumption that M is in-range, it holds that
vj ≥ pv for some relevant buyer j ∈ N . Define
J = {j : vj ≥ pv : j is allocated a non-zero number of units}
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as the set of all relevant buyers with valuations at least as high as the envy-free price chosen by M .
Now, consider an instance v1 such that v1i = vi for all buyers i ∈ N\{j1} and v
1
j1
= pmin + γ
for some buyer j1 ∈ J , i.e. the instance obtained by v when some buyer j1 ∈ J reports a valuation
equal to pmin+ γ. Let p1 be the price outputted by M on input v
1. Note that since on instance v1
buyer j1’s valuation is still higher than pmin, it holds that pmin is still the minimum envy-free price
in O on the profile v1.
• Assume first that p1 = pmin. In that case, buyer j1 on input profile v would have an incentive
to misreport its valuation as v1j1 = pmin + γ; that would lower the price and since Bj1 is
fixed, the buyer would receive at least the same amount of units at a lower price (since it still
appears to be hungry at price pmin). This would contradict the truthfulness of M .
• Now consider the case when p1 = v
1
j1
= pmin + γ. Note that since p1 > pmin, it holds that
⌊Bj1/p1⌋ ≤ ⌊Bj1/pmin⌋, i.e. buyer j1 can not demand more units at price p1 compared to
pmin. On profile v, it would be possible to allocate ⌊Bj1/pmin⌋ units to buyer j1 at price
pmin, therefore on profile v
1, it is possible to allocate ⌊Bj1/p1⌋ units to buyer j1 at price
p1 = pmin+ γ. Buyer j1 is semi-hungry at p1 but since M is non-wasteful, it must allocate at
least ⌊Bi/p1⌋ ≥ ⌊Bi/pv⌋ units to buyer j1 at a price p1 < pv, and buyer j1 increases its utility
by misreporting.
From the discussion above, it must hold that p1 > pmin + γ. For the valuation profile v
1 (which
can be seen as the different instance where buyer 1 has deviated from v1 to pmin + γ), update the
set J := {j : vj ≥ p1 : j is allocated a non-zero number of units}. If J = ∅, then Mechanism M is
not in-range and we have obtained a contradiction. Otherwise, there must exist some other buyer
j2 ∈ J with valuation higher than p1.
Now, consider such a buyer j2 ∈ J and the instance v
2 such that v2i = v
1
i for all buyers
i ∈ N\{j2} and v
2
j2
= pmin+ γ for buyer j2, i.e. the instance obtained from v
1 when some buyer j2
in J misreports its value being between pmin + γ. Note that for the same reasons explained above,
pmin is the minimum envy-free price in O on profile v
2 as well. Let p2 be the price outputted by M
on valuation profile v2. Using exactly the same arguments as we did before, we can argue that by
truthfulness, it holds that p2 /∈ {pmin, pmin + γ} and therefore it must hold that p2 > pmin + γ, as
every other choice is not envy-free.
By iteratively considering sequences of valuations obtained in this manner, we eventually obtain
an instance vk−1 such that J = {jk}, i.e. there is only one buyer with a valuation higher than the
envy-free price pk−1 output by M . Repeating the argument once more will result in a valuation
profile vk where the price pk is higher than the reported valuation v
k
jk
= pmin + γ of buyer jk and
the set J will be empty, contradicting the fact that M is in-range.
Overall, this implies that M either violates truthfulness, non-wastefulness or in-range, contra-
dicting our assumption. 
We remark here that in the continuous domain, Lemma 6 can be strengthened so that M can
only output the minimum envy-free price, whenever it exists. Using Lemma 6, we can now prove
the theorem.
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Proof: (of Theorem 7) Assume by contradiction that such an in-range, non-wasteful and truthful
mechanism M exists. We will consider three different instances5 with n = 2 and m = 3, denoted
(v1, v2) where v1 denotes the valuation of buyer 1 and v2 denotes the valuation of buyer 2, with
budgets B1 = B2 = 6 + 2γ.
First, consider the instance (2.5, 2.5) and note that since the instance is not trivial and since
the minimum envy-free price is 2.5, by Lemma 6, the price chosen by M for this instance must be
either 2.5 or 2.5 + γ. Furthermore, since M is in-range, the price can not be 2.5 + γ, therefore the
price chosen on (2.5, 2.5) is 2.5. Since M is non-wasteful and each buyer can afford exactly 2 items
at price 2.5 and there are 3 available items, one buyer (wlog buyer 1) gets allocated 2 items and
the other buyer (wlog buyer 2) gets allocated 1 item at this price.
Now consider the instance (3, 2.5) and note that since it is not trivial and since again, 2.5 is the
minimum envy-free price, M must either output 2.5 or 2.5 + γ as the price. Assume first that M
selects the price to be 2.5+ γ. Since buyer 1 is hungry at this price and can afford to buy exactly 2
units, its allocation on instance (3, 2.5) is 2 units at price 2.5+γ. But then, on instance (3, 2.5) buyer
1 would have an incentive to misreport its valuation as being 2.5 since on the resulting instance,
which is (2.5, 2.5), it still receives 2 items at a lower price, increasing its utility. Note that if it was
buyer 2 that received 2 items on instance (2.5, 2.5), we could have made the same argument using
instance (2.5, 3) instead.
Finally, assume that on instance (3, 2.5), M outputs 2.5 as the price. By non-wastefulness, buyer
2 receives exactly 1 unit at this price. But then, consider the instance (3, 3), where, using the same
arguments as in the case of instance (2.5, 2.5), MechanismM must output 3 as the price and allocate
2 units to one buyer and 1 unit to the other buyer. Crucially, both buyers have utility 0 on instance
(3, 3). But then, buyer 2 could misreport its valuation as being 2.5, resulting in instance (3, 2.5)
where it receives 1 unit at a price lower than its actual valuation, benefiting from the misreport.
This contradicts truthfulness.
Assume by contradiction that such an in-range, non-wasteful and truthful mechanismM exists.
Consider the same instance I1 as the one used in the proof of Theorem 6, with n = 2, m = 3 and
v1 = v2 = 3 and B1 = B2 = 6 + 2γ. (Again the proof can be generalized to many agents and
units similarly to the proof of Theorem 6). By Lemma 6 and since I1 is not trivial, M must either
output p = 3 or p = 3 + γ and by the fact that it is in-range, it must output p = 3. Since M is
non-wasteful, it must allocate 2 units to one of the buyers with valuation 3 (wlog buyer 1) and 1
unit to the other buyer.
Now consider an instance I2a where v
′
1 = 3 and v
′
2 = 2.5. Since 2.5 is now the minimum envy-
free price and I2 is again not trivial, M must output either p
′ = 2.5 or p = 2.5 + γ. We will obtain
a contradiction for each case. Assume first that p′ = 2.5; since buyer 1 is hungry, it must hold that
x′1 = 2 and by non-wastefulness, it must hold that x
′
1 = 1. In that case however, for the same reason
explained in the proof of Theorem 6, v′2 = 2.5 could be a beneficial deviation of buyer 2 on instance
I1, violating truthfulness. Now we argue for the case when p
′ = 2.5 + γ. Consider the instance I3
where v¯1 = v¯2 = 2.5. Since M is in-range and I3 is not trivial, M must select price p¯ = 2.5, since
every other price is either not envy-free, or higher than all the valuations. By non-wastefulness,
one buyer must receive 2 units at p¯ and the other agent must receive 1 unit (because each buyer
can afford exactly 2 units and there are 3 units available). If buyer 1 receives 2 units, i.e. x¯1 = 2,
misreporting its valuation on instance I2a as 2.5 would give the buyer higher utility, since it gets
5The instances can be extended to any number of buyers by simply adding buyers with very low valuations and
to many items by scaling the valuations and budgets appropriately.
16
allocated the same number of items at a lower price. It remains to deal with the case when on
instance I3, buyer 1 is allocated 1 item and buyer 2 is allocated 2 items, i.e. x¯1 = 1 and x¯2 = 2.
Now consider the instance I2b where vˆ1 = 2.5 and vˆ2 = 3, i.e. instance I2b is exactly the same as
instance I2a with the indices of the two buyers swapped. Again, since instance I2b is not trivial, by
Lemma 6, M must output a price pˆ ∈ {2.5, 2.5+γ}. If pˆ = 2.5+γ, then we consider again Instance
I3. Since on that instance p¯ = 2.5 and x¯2 = 2 by the assumption above, buyer 2 has an incentive to
misreport its valuation on instance I2b as being 2.5, contradicting truthfulness. Therefore, it must
hold that pˆ = 2.5 on instance I2b.
However, by non-wastefulness, buyer 1 receives one unit at price pˆ on instance I2b, i.e. xˆ1 = 1.
We will consider the 2.5 as a potential deviation of buyer 1 on instance I1 (where its true valuation
is v1 = 3). The utility of the buyer before misreporting is 0 (since the chosen price on instance I1 is
p = 3) whereas the utility after misreporting is 3− 2.5 = 0.5, i.e. strictly positive. Therefore, buyer
1 has a beneficial deviation on instance I1, violating the truthfulness of M .
By truthfulness, it must also hold that p¯ ≥ 2.5+γ, otherwise on instance I2 buyer 1 would have
an incentive to misreport its valuation as 2.5 + γ and still receive 2 items at a lower price (since at
any price p < 2.5 + γ buyer 1 on instance I3 is hungry). From the discussion above, it must hold
that p¯ = 2.5 + γ and by non-wastefulness and since buyer 1 can afford two items at price 2.5 + γ,
it must hold that x¯1 = 2. 
5 Discussion
Our results show that it is possible to achieve good approximate truthful mechanisms, under rea-
sonable assumptions on the competitiveness of the auctions which retain some of the attractive
properties of the Walrasian equilibrium solutions. The same agenda could be applied to more gen-
eral auctions, beyond the case of linear valuations or even beyond multi-unit auctions. It would be
interesting to obtain a complete characterization of truthfulness in the case of private or known
budgets; for the case of private budgets, we can show that a class of order statistic mechanisms
are truthful, but the welfare or revenue guarantees for this case may be poor. In the appendix
we present an interesting special case, that of monotone auctions, in which Mechanism All-Or-
Nothing is optimal among all truthful mechanisms for both objectives, regardless of the market
share.
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APPENDIX
A Monotone Auctions
In the main text, we proved the approximation ratio guarantees of Mechanism All-or-Nothing,
as a function of the market share. In this section, we will examine the case of common budgets and
the more general class of monotone auctionss:
• The budgets are common when Bi = B for all buyers i ∈ N .
• The budgets are monotone in the valuations when vi ≥ vj ⇔ Bi ≥ Bj. We call such auctions
monotone.
Note that the second case is more general than the first, where for the right-hand side we have
Bi = Bj for all i, j ∈ N . We will prove that for those cases, Mechanism All-or-Nothing is
optimal among all truthful mechanisms, for both the welfare and the revenue objective. For the
welfare objective, the approximation ratio guarantee will be completely independent of the market
share. For the revenue objective, the dependence will be rather weak; we prove that the bound
holds in all auctions except monopsonies. A monopsony is an auctionin which a single buyer can
afford to buy all the items at a very high price.
Definition 4 An auction is a monopsony, if the buyer with the highest valuation v1 has enough
budget B1 to buy all the units at a price equal to the second highest valuation v2.
Note that when the market is not a monopsony, that implies that the market share s∗ is less
than 1.6
Theorem 8 The approximation ratio of Mechanism All-or-Nothing for monotone auctions is
• at most 2 for the social welfare objective.
• at most 2 for the revenue objective when the auction is not a monopsony.
Furthermore, no truthful mechanism can achieve an approximation ratio smaller than 2− 4m+2 even
in the case of common budgets.
Proof: First, note that the profile constructed in Theorem 5 is one where the budgets are common
and therefore the lower bound extends to both cases mentioned above. Therefore, it suffices to prove
the approximation ratio of Mechanism All-or-Nothing for both objectives, when the auction is
monotone.
We start from the social welfare objective and consider an arbitrary profile v. Without loss of
generality, we can assume that v is not trivial (otherwise the optimal allocation allocates 0 items in
6Note that instead of ruling out monopsonies, another approach would be to consider a different benchmark, that
does not include the case of an omnipotent buyer, like the EFO(2) benchmark for revenue, see [Har13], Chapter 6.
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total) and note that the optimal envy-free price is p∗ = pmin and let x be the corresponding optimal
allocation. Following the arguments in the proof of Theorem 3, we establish that the according to x
at most one additional semi-hungry buyer is allocated a positive number of units, compared to the
allocation of Mechanism All-or-Nothing; let ℓ be that buyer and let xℓ be its optimal allocation.
The social welfare loss of Mechanism All-or-Nothing is xℓ · vℓ ≤ vℓ · ⌊Bℓ/vℓ⌋, i.e. the con-
tribution of the the semi-hungry buyer that receives 0 items by All-or-Nothing, in contrast to
the optimal allocation. Since the profile v is not trivial, there exists at least on other buyer j that
receives min{m, ⌊Bj/vℓ⌋} units in the optimal allocation x. If it receives m units, then xℓ = 0
and the ratio on the profile is 1. Otherwise, the contribution to the welfare (for both the optimal
allocation and the allocation of All-or-Nothing) from buyer j is vj · ⌊Bj/vℓ⌋} ≥ vj · ⌊Bℓ/vℓ⌋},
since vℓ ≤ vj ⇔ Bℓ ≤ Bj by the monotonicity of the auction. Then we have:
SW(AON)
OPT
≥
OPT − vℓ · ⌊Bℓ/vℓ⌋
OPT
= 1−
vℓ · ⌊Bℓ/vℓ⌋
OPT
≥ 1−
vℓ · ⌊Bℓ/vℓ⌋
(vℓ + vj) · ⌊Bℓ/vℓ⌋
= 1−
vℓ
vj + vℓ
≥
1
2
.
For the revenue objective, again let p∗ be the optimal envy-free price and let x be the corre-
sponding allocation. We consider two cases:
• p∗ = pmin: The argument in this case is very similar to the one used above for the social
welfare objective. In particular, since p∗ = pmin = vℓ, we now have that the loss in revenue
from the semi-hungry buyer ℓ for Mechanism All-or-Nothing is at most xℓ ·vℓ ≤ vℓ ·⌊Bℓ/vℓ⌋
whereas the contribution from buyer j is vℓ · ⌊Bj/vℓ⌋}, which is at most vℓ · ⌊Bℓ/vℓ⌋} by the
monotonicity of the auction. Therefore, we have that:
REV(AON)
OPT
≥
OPT − vℓ · ⌊Bℓ/vℓ⌋
OPT
= 1−
vℓ · ⌊Bℓ/vℓ⌋
OPT
≥ 1−
vℓ · ⌊Bℓ/vℓ⌋
2vℓ · ⌊Bℓ/vℓ⌋
= 1−
vℓ
2vℓ
=
1
2
.
• p∗ > pmin. In that case, the argument is exactly the same as in Case 2 of the proof of Theorem
3, which holds when the market share is less than 1, i.e. when the auction is not a monopsony.

To complete the picture, we prove in the following that if the auction is a monopsony, the ap-
proximation ratio of any truthful mechanism is unbounded. This can be captured by the following
theorem.
Theorem 9 If the auction is a monopsony, the approximation ratio of any truthful mechanism for
the revenue objective is at least B for any B > 1, even if the budgets are public.
Proof: Consider the following monopsony. Let i1 = argmaxi vi, for i = 1, . . . , n be a single
buyer with the highest valuation and denote vi1 = v1 for ease of notation. Similarly, let i2 ∈
argmaxi∈N\{i1} vi be one buyer with the second largest valuation and let vi2 = v2. Furthermore,
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let v1 > vi for all i 6= i1 and Bi1 = p ·m, for some v2 < p ≤ v1 i.e. buyer i1 can afford to buy all
the units at some price p > v2. Additionally, let Bi2 ≥ v2, i.e. buyer i2 can afford to buy at least
one unit at price v2.
7 Finally, for a given B > 1 let v2 and p be such that B = p/v2. Note that the
revenue-maximizing envy-free price for the instance v is at least p and the maximum revenue is at
least p ·m.
Assume for contradiction that there exists a truthful mechanism M with approximation ratio
smaller than B and let p∗ be the envy-free price output by M on v. Since p∗ is envy-free and
Bi1 > v1 · m and Bi2 ≥ v2, it can not be the case that p
∗ < v, otherwise there would be over-
demand for the units. Furthermore, by assumption it can not be the case that p∗ = v2 as otherwise
the ratio would be B and therefore it must hold that p∗ > v2.
Now let v′ be the instance where all buyers have the same valuation as in v except for buyer i1
that has value v′1 such that v < v
′
1 < p
∗ and let p˜ be the envy-free price that M outputs on input
v′. If p˜ > v′1, then the ratio of M on the instance v
′ is infinite, a contradiction. If p˜ ≤ v′1 and since
p˜ is envy-free, it holds that v2 ≤ p˜ < p
∗. In that case however, on instance v, buyer i1 would have
an incentive to misreport its valuation as v′1 and reduce the price. The buyer still receives all the
units at a lower price and hence its utility increases as a result of the devation, contradicting the
truthfulness of M . 
B Computational Results
In this section we study the problem of computing a welfare and revenue maximizing envy-free
pricing without incentives. A welfare maximizing envy-free pricing can be computed efficiently
using the following algorithm.
Algorithm 2: Find the minimum envy-free price in the set P and allocate maximally to the buyers
(using greedy allocation and lexicographic tie-breaking for the indifferent buyers).
Theorem 10 Algorithm 2 computes a welfare maximizing envy-free pricing in time polynomial in
n and logm for linear multi-unit markets.
The correctness and running time of the algorithm are based on the observation that the social
welfare is non-increasing in the price which together with Lemma 1 allows us to search for the
minimum envy-free price in the set P. This can be done by first checking all n values vi, for
i = 1, . . . , n and then for each buyer i, by checking over the ordered set
{
⌊Bim ⌋, ⌊
Bi
m−1⌋, . . . , ⌊Bi⌋
}
using binary search.
For revenue we design a fully polynomial time approximation scheme as well as an exact algo-
rithm that runs in polynomial time for constantly many types of buyers. Without loss of generality,
the buyers can be assumed to be ordered by their valuations: v1 ≥ v2 ≥ . . . ≥ vn.
7Note that setting Bi2 = Bi1 satisfies this constraint and creates an auction with identical budgets, so the proof
goes through for that case as well.
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B.1 Fully Polynomial Time Approximation Scheme for Revenue
Theorem 11 There exists an FPTAS for computing a revenue-maximizing envy-free pricing in
linear multi-unit markets.
The main idea is to divide the analysis in two cases, depending on whether the number of units is
large (at least n/ǫ) or small. When the number of units is large, we solve a continuous variant of
the problem, where the good is viewed as a continuous resource valued uniformly by each buyer i,
at total value vi ·m. The buyers have the same budgets Bi. The continuous problem can be solved
efficiently, and by rounding one obtains a solution in the discrete instance with bounded loss. When
the number of units is small, we can iterate over the set P of candidate prices in polynomial time
and find a revenue-maximizing envy-free price and allocation.
Consider the continuous linear multi-unit market, defined above. Note that in such a market,
every interested buyer must receive exactly a (Bi/p)-fraction of the good, since the allocation does
not have to be integer. As shown next, the revenue-maximizing envy-free price in the continuous
variant can be computed in polynomial time.
Lemma 7 A revenue maximizing envy-free price for the continuous linear multi-unit market can
be computed in polynomial time. Moreover, the price is equal to a valuation.
Proof: Recall the valuations are ordered: v1 ≥ v2 ≥ . . . ≥ vn. Let p be a revenue maxinimizing
envy-free price for the continuous problem. If p = vi for some i ∈ N the lemma trivially follows.
Otherwise, p ∈ (vℓ, vℓ+1) for some ℓ ∈ N . Since the resource is continuous and p maximizes revenue,
the budgets of buyers 1, 2, . . . , ℓ are exhausted at price p, while buyers ℓ1, . . . , n have zero demand
and the revenue is
∑ℓ
i=1Bi. By setting the price to vℓ, we can obtain exactly the same revenue,
since the set of buyers that purchases any units is still {1, 2, . . . , ℓ} and the budgets of all buyers
in this set are still exhausted. By Lemma 1, vℓ is an envy-free price and by the argument above, it
maximizes revenue. 
The next lemmas concern the revenue achieved in the continuous problem and enable connecting
the maximum revenue in the continuous problem to the discrete one.
Lemma 8 The optimal revenue in a continuous linear multi-unit market is at least as high as in
the discrete version.
Proof: Let (p, x) be a price and allocation that maximize revenue for the discrete problem; denote
by R the revenue obtained. Set the price p in the continuous version and consider two cases:
Case 1 : The demand is (weakly) lower than the supply at p. Then the same revenue R can be
obtained in the continuous version.
Case 2 : The demand is higher than the supply. Then we can continuously increase the price
until the demand can be met as follows. Let p′ be the current price in the continuous problem. If
p′ ∈ (vℓ, vℓ+1), then by continuously increasing p
′ the demand decreases continuously. If the demand
is never met in the interior of this interval, then when the price reaches vℓ, we can continuously
decrease the allocation of buyer ℓ until either reaching an envy-free pricing or making buyer ℓ’s
allocation zero (the case where there are multiple buyers with valuation vℓ is handled similarly, by
decreasing their allocations in some sequence). In the latter case, since the demand still exceeds
the supply, we iterate by increasing the price continuously in the interval [vℓ−1, vℓ).
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From the two cases, the optimal revenue in the discrete problem is no higher than in the
continuous problem, which completes the proof. 
Lemma 9 Given the optimal revenue R for the continuous linear multi-unit market, setting the
price to p = R/m gives an envy-free pricing scheme with the same revenue where the whole resource
is sold.
Proof: By Lemma 7, the optimal revenue in the continuous problem can be computed in poly-
nomial time by inspecting all the valuations. Let R denote the optimal continuous revenue. If none
of the prices where the optimal revenue can be obtained support an allocation at which the entire
resource is sold, then the price can be decreased continuously (skipping the valuation points as they
have been considered before) while maintaining the revenue constant until the entire resource is
sold. By continuity (taking the valuation points into account), there exists a revenue maximizing
price at which the whole resource is sold.
This problem can be solved in polynomial time by finding the buyer ℓ ∈ [n] with the property
that
∑ℓ
i=1Bi = R. Set p =
R
m and compute the corresponding allocation, where buyers ℓ+1, . . . , n
don’t receive anything. 
The FPTAS for revenue is given as Algorithm 1 and the proof of correctness is as follows.
Input: Buyers N with linear valuations v, budgets b, m units and ǫ > 0.
Output: An envy-free pricing (p∗,x∗) with revenue at least (1 − ǫ)R, where R is the maximum
revenue.
1: if m ≤ nǫ then
2: for each price p ∈ P do
3: Check if p is envy-free. If not, continue with the next candidate price.
4: xp ← Compute-EF-Allocation(p)
5: Rp ← Revenue of (xp, p).
6: end for
7: p∗ ← argmaxpRp.
8: return (p∗,xp∗)
9: else
10: (x, p)← Compute-Continuous(N,v,b,m)
11: For all ∈ N , let x¯i = ⌊xi⌋. ⊲ Round the allocation down to integers
12: return (p, x¯).
13: end if
Algorithm 1: FPTAS Revenue-Maximizing-EF-Pricing(N,v,b,m)
Proof: (of Theorem 11) We show that Algorithm 1 is such an FPTAS. Let ǫ > 0 and consider
two cases, depending on whether the number of units is small or large.
Case 1 : m ≤ nǫ . In this case we can just iterate over all the possible prices in P and select
the revenue maximizing envy-free price and the corresponding allocation. This step can be done in
time O
(
n2
ǫ
)
.
Case 2 : m > nǫ . In this case we first solve the continuous linear multi-unit market optimally
by finding the price and allocation (p,x) where the whole resource is sold. This can be done in
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Compute-Continuous(N,v,b,m) ⊲ function that computes a revenue-maximizing price where
everything is sold in the continuous case
1: for i = 1 to n do
2: Check if the price vi is envy-free. If not, continue with the next valuation.
3: xi ← Compute-EF-Allocation(vi).
4: Ri ← Revenue of (xi, vi).
5: end for
6: R← maxiR
i
7: p∗ ←R/m.
8: x∗ ← Compute-EF-Allocation(p∗).
9: return(p∗,x∗)
Compute-EF-Allocation(p) ⊲ function that computes an envy-free allocation at price p
10: for each buyer i ∈ N such that vi > p do ⊲ Interested buyers
11: xi ← Di ⊲ Demand sets are singletons
12: end for
13: for each buyer i ∈ N such that vi = p do ⊲ Indifferent buyers
14: if #available units > 0 then
15: xi ← min{#available units,Di}
16: end if
17: end for
polynomial time by Lemma 9. Now consider the allocation x˜, given by x˜i = ⌊xi⌋, i.e. the allocation
obtained from x if we round all fractions down to the nearest integer value. Note that (p, x˜) is an
envy-free pricing in the discrete problem, since each buyer receives their demand. We argue that
(p, x˜) approximates the optimal revenue of the discrete instance within a factor of 1− ǫ.
Let OPT c and OPT d denote the optimal revenues in the continuous and discrete instances,
respectively, and Rd the revenue obtained by the rounding procedure above.
We obtain the following inequalities:
Rd
OPT d
≥
OPT c − p · n
OPT d
=
p ·m− p · n
OPT d
≥
p ·m− p · n
OPT c
≥
p ·m− p · n
p ·m
= 1−
n
m
> 1− ǫ
The first inequality holds because the rounding procedure only loses at most pn revenue, the second
identity holds because all the units are sold at price p, and the third inequality holds by Lemma 8.
This step can be completed in time O(n2). The total runtime is bounded by the maximum in each
case, which is O
(
n2/ǫ
)
. 
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B.2 Exact Algorithm for Revenue
In this section we provide an exact algorithm for computing a revenue maximizing (Walrasian)
envy-free pricing. This algorithm runs in polynomial time when the number of types of buyers is
fixed.
Theorem 12 Given a linear multi-unit market, a revenue-maximizing envy-free pricing can be
computed in polynomial time when the number of types (of buyers) is fixed.
The following problem generalizes the problem of computing a revenue-maximizing envy-free
pricing scheme.
Problem 1 Given α1, α2, ..., αℓ ∈ Q, output x ∈ argmax
∑ℓ
i=1
⌊αix⌋
x , x ∈ [a, b] ∩ N.
Lemma 10 If Problem 1 can be solved in polynomial time, then the problem of finding a revenue-
maximizing envy-free pricing scheme can be solved in polynomial time as well.
Proof: First, recall that by Lemma 2, the revenue-maximizing envy-free price p is in set P,
i.e. it is either equal to some valuation vi or equal to some fraction Bi/k, for some i ∈ N and
some k ∈ [1,m] ∩ N, which means that at least one of the budgets is exhausted at that price and
allocation. In the former case, we can simply iterate over all n values v1, . . . , vn and the revenue-
maximizing price can be found in polynomial time and by Lemma 3, so can the corresponding
revenue-maximizing allocation and the lemma holds. Therefore, we will assume that p = Bi/k for
some i ∈ N and some integer k ≤ m. We will show how to find the revenue-maximizing price given
that some buyer’s j budget is exhausted; then we can iterate over all the buyers and calculate the
revenue obtained in each case, outputting the price and allocation with the maximum revenue.
Let αi = Bi/Bj and let x be the allocation of buyer j. From the discussion above, it holds that
p = Bj/x. Assuming that buyer i is hungry at price p, the revenue obtained by buyer i is
p ·
⌊
Bi
p
⌋
=
Bj
x
·
⌊
αi ·Bj
x
⌋
= Bj
⌊αix⌋
x
,
The total revenue is REV = Bj ·
(∑l
i=1
⌊αix⌋
x
)
, where l is the number of hungry buyers at price
p = Bj/x.
Now, given that a revenue-maximizing envy-free price is not equal to some valuation vi, it lies
in an interval (vi+1, vi) for some i ∈ N . For each such interval I, the set of hungry buyers SI at any
chosen price consists of the buyers with valuations vj ≥ vi and hence we know exactly the members
of this set. By the discussion above, by letting ℓ = |SI | in Problem 1, the value of the quantity∑ℓ
i=1
⌊aix⌋
x gives exactly the maximum revenue attained in the interval (vi+1, vi). By iterating over
all intervals, we can find the revenue-maximizing price and allocation.
What is left to show is that the envy-freeness constraint can be captured by the constraint
x ∈ [a, b] ∩ N. Note that the fact that the price lies in some open interval between two valuations
and the envy-freeness constraint define an interval [c, d] from which the price has to be chosen. The
value of c is either the minimum envy-free price in P or the smallest price in P strictly larger than
vi+1 whereas the value of d is the largest price in P strictly smaller than vi. All of these prices
can be found in polynomial time by binary search on the set P, similarly to the algorithm for
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maximizing welfare. Therefore, the price constraint can be written as p ∈ [c, d] ∩ P and by setting
a = Bj/d and b = Bj/c, we obtain the corresponding interval of Problem 1. 
By Lemma 10, it is sufficient to prove that Problem 1 can be solved in polynomial time; the
same algorithm will also find a revenue-maximizing envy-free pricing scheme. By setting ki = ⌊aix⌋,
from Problem 1 we obtain the following equivalent problem:
Problem 2 Given a, b, αi ∈ Q,
max
k1 + ...+ kℓ
x
s.t. ki ≤ αix < ki + 1, i = 1, 2, ..., ℓ
a ≤ x ≤ b
x, ki ∈ Z, i = 1, 2, ..., ℓ
Problem 2 is obviously an optimization problem with a non-linear objective function. We will
consider the decision version of the problem, where the value of the objective function is restricted
to lie in some interval.
Problem 3 Given a, b, c, d, αi ∈ Q, decide if there exist x, k1, . . . , kn ∈ Z such that
cx ≤ k1 + ...+ kn ≤ dx
ki ≤ αix < ki + 1, i = 1, 2, ..., n
a ≤ x ≤ b
x, ki ∈ Z, i = 1, 2, ..., n
We are now ready to prove Theorem 12.
Proof: (of Theorem 12) We will prove that Problem 2 can be solved in polynomial time, by
proving that Problem 4 can be written as an Integer Linear Program (ILP) problem and then
providing an algorithm for Problem 2 given an algorithm for Problem 4. Since Problem 1 and
Problem 2 are equivalent (by Lemma 10), this will also establish the existence of a polynomial
time algorithm for finding a revenue-maximizing envy-free pricing scheme. First, the ILP problem
is known to be solvable in polynomial time when the number of variables is fixed.
Lemma 11 ([LJ83]) The ILP problem with a fixed number of variables can be solved in polynomial
time.
In order to show that Problem 4 can be written as an ILP, we need to handle the non-integer
coefficients. For every coefficient j ∈ Q, we multiply their common denominator in each equation
and all coefficients become integers, without affecting the length of the input. The inequalities that
have the “≥” direction can be handled easily. To handle the strict inequality constraint, for each
such constraint such that A < B, we instead write 2A ≤ 2B − 1 instead. Since A and B are linear
expressions involving integers, these constraints are equivalent to the original ones. Finally, the
constraints for which the inequality has the “≥” direction can be handled easily using standard
techniques.
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The connection above established that Problem 4 can be solved in polynomial time when the
number of input variables ℓ is fixed. To show that Problem 2 can be solved in polynomial time
as well, we will do binary search on the interval [0,
∑ℓ
i=1 αi] where each time a feasible solution is
obtained, it will be an improvement over the previously found solution. The termination condition is
when the length of the interval becomes smaller than 1/b2. Since the algorithm for solving Problem
2 is invoked at most log b2
∑
αi times, the binary search algorithm terminates in polynomial time.
The details of the algorithm can be found in Algorithm 2. 
Input: αi ∈ Q, a, b ∈ N
∗
Output: x
1: cˆ := 0, dˆ :=
∑
αi
2: while dˆ− cˆ > 1b2 do
3: t := cˆ+dˆ2
4: if Problem 4 has no solution for c = t, d = dˆ then
5: dˆ := t
6: else
7: cˆ := t
8: end if
9: end while
10: return x, k1, . . . , kℓ computed for the last instance of Problem 4.
Algorithm 2: Algorithm for Problem 2 using an algorithm for Problem 4.
B.3 NP-hardness of Problem 1
A natural question would be whether one could use Problem 1 to construct a polynomial-time
algorithm for finding a revenue-maximizing envy-free pricing scheme in linear multi-unit markets,
for any number of buyers. In this subsection, we prove that unless P=NP, this is not possible. Note
that the hardness of the problem does not imply NP-hardness of finding a revenue-maximizing
envy-free pricing scheme in the market.
Theorem 13 Problem 1 is NP-hard.
To prove Theorem 13, we will construct a series of problems that each could be solved using a
polynomial time algorithm for the previous problem, with the last problem being the well-known
k-Clique problem. Consider the following problem.
Problem 4 Input: pi, qi ∈ N
∗ for i = 1, 2, . . . , n and a, b ∈ N∗
Output: argmin
∑n
i=1
pix mod qi
qix
, x ∈ [a, b] ∩N∗
It is not hard to see that Problem 1 is equivalent to Problem 4, and it is sufficient to consider
the case when x ∈ (kΠqi, (k + 1)Πqi), k ∈ Z, otherwise it is trivial to obtain an objective function
of value 0. Next, we will prove that the objective function satisfies a monotonicity condition when
a is sufficiently large.
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Lemma 12 Denote r(x) =
∑ pix mod qi
qi
. If a > n(Πqi)
2, then
r(x1) ≤ r(x2)⇔
r(x1)
x1
≤
r(x2)
x2
.
Proof: First, notice that following the discussion above about the interval in which we should be
searching for x, it holds that r(x2) ≥ r(x1) +
1
Πqi
. This implies that
r(x1)x2 − r(x2)x1 ≤ r(x1)x2 − r(x1)x1 −
x1
Πqi
.
If r(x1) ≤ r(x2), then r(x1)x2 − r(x2)x1 is at most nΠqi −
x1
Πqi
which is at most 0, since
x2 − x1 < Πqi, r(x) ≤ n for any x and x1 ≥ a ≥ n(Πqi)
2.
The other direction can be shown similarly. 
Now consider the following problem and observe that by Lemma 12, it is special case of Problem
4.
Problem 5 Input: pi, qi ∈ N
∗ for i = 1, 2, . . . , n and a, b ∈ (nΠqi, (n+ 1)Πqi).
Output: argmin
∑n
i=1
pix mod qi
qi
, x ∈ [a, b] ∩N∗
By subtracting nΠqi from the solutions to Problem 5, we obtain the following equivalent prob-
lem.
Problem 6 Input: pi, qi ∈ N
∗ for i = 1, 2 . . . , n) and a, b ∈ (0,Πqi) ∩ N
∗
Output: argmin
∑n
i=1
pix mod qi
qi
, x ∈ [a, b] ∩N∗
As a special case of Problem 5, we double n and set pi = 1 for n terms and pi = qi − 1 for the
other n terms. We obtain the following problem.
Problem 7 Input: a, b ∈ (0,Πqi) ∩ N
∗, qi ∈ N
∗ for i = 1, 2, . . . , n
Output: argmin
∑n
i=1
x mod qi
qi
+ (qi−1)x mod qiqi , x ∈ [a, b] ∩ N
∗
Note that for each term in the sum of Problem 7, the term it equals to 0 if qi|x the term equals
to 1 if qi ∤ x. To minimize the objective function in Problem 7 we want to maximize the number
of zero terms. Let U = {q1, q2, ..., qn} denote the set of the qi and consider the following problem,
which can be solved by solving Problem 7.
Problem 8 Input: a, b ∈ (0,Πqi) ∩ N∗, U
Output: max k such that X ⊆ U, |X| = k, qi|x ∀qi ∈ X,x ∈ [a, b] ∩ N
∗
Next we construct a special case of Problem 7. We first construct a base set W and then set each
qi to be the product of some elements in W . Let
W = {M,M + 1,M + 2, ...,M + n2 − 1},M > 2nn4.
We prove the following lemma.
Lemma 13 If 1 ≤ x ≤ (M +n2− 1)k, then for any k(k < n2) different elements in W there exists
x s.t. x is divisible by them simultaneously. There does not exist x s.t. x is divisible by any k + 1
different elements in W simultaneously.
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Proof: The first part is obvious. For the second part, note that the greatest common divisor
between any two elements in W is at most n2, so if x is divisible by k + 1 different elements in W
simultaneously, x > M
k+1
1
2
k(k+1)n2
, the right side is larger than (M + n2 − 1)k. 
For Problem 7, given T < n2, we set a = 1, b = (M +n2− 1)T , and each pi to be the product of
a subset Qi of W . For this to be a special case of Problem 8, it has to be that Πqi > b. To ensure
this, we first consider the case when T ≥
∑
i |Qi|, where the solution can easily be seen to be n.
For the case when T <
∑
i |Qi|, setting b = (M +n
2− 1)T means that b < Πqi since the product of
any T + 1 elements in W is larger than (M + n2 − 1)T . Now x is divisible by at most T different
elements in W simultaneously and we obtain the following problem as a special case.
Problem 9 Input: Q1, Q2, ..., Qn ⊆W,T
Output: max k such that X ⊆W, |X| ≤ T,
∑n
i=1 I(Qi ⊆ X) = k
Now consider a graph G = (V,E) where |V | = n, and let Qi = {wi1, wi2, ..., win}, where wij ∈W
and let wij = wji if (i, j) ∈ E, wij 6= wji if (i, j) /∈ E. Since |W | = n
2 there are enough elements to
construct Qi. Given k < n, we set T = nk −
1
2k(k − 1) and we obtain a special case of Problem 9.
Problem 10 On input k, decide whether there exists X ∈W s.t. |X| ≤ nk− 12k(k−1),
∑n
i=1 I(Qi ⊆
X) = k
Finally, we will prove that Problem 10 is NP-hard, by a reduction to k-Clique.
Lemma 14 The answer to Problem 10 is yes if and only if Graph G has a k-clique.
Proof: Note that the cardinality of the union of the k subsets Qi equals to nk minus the total
number of edges in the Qi’s corresponding subgraph of G. It is larger than nk −
1
2k(k − 1) if the
corresponding subgraph is not a clique, so X can not cover them. 
Since every problem was a special case of the previous one, this establishes Theorem 13.
B.4 The General Model
In general, the valuation of a buyer for different numbers of copies is not necessarily a linear function
of that number, so each buyer has a valuation vector vi, such that vi,j represents buyer i’s valuation
for receiving j units of the good.
ui(p, x) =
{
vi,xi − p · xi, if p · xi ≤ Bi.
−∞, otherwise.
(1)
The demand of a buyer is defined as
Di = {y : y ∈ argmax
xi
ui(p, xi) , p · y ≤ Bi},
i.e. a set consisting of allocations that make the buyer maximally satisfied at the chosen price and
respect its budget constraint. The definition of an envy-free pricing scheme is the same as the one
given in the Preliminaries section.
We will first prove that finding a social welfare-maximizing or a revenue-maximizing envy-free
price and allocation is NP-hard by a reduction from Subset-sum and then we prove that both
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problems admit an FPTAS by using a variant of Knapsack called Multi-choice Knapsack.
Note that since buyers have to specify their values vi,j for all possible number of units that they
might receive, the input size to the problems here is n and m instead of n and logm, which was the
input size for the linear multi-unit market. This means that an NP-hardness result for the linear
case would not imply NP-hardness for the general case and an FPTAS for the general case does
not imply an FPTAS for the linear case.
Theorem 14 Given a multi-unit market with general valuations, it is NP-hard to compute a
revenue-maximizing or social welfare-maximizing envy-free price and allocation.
Proof: We construct a reduction from the NP-complete problem Subset-Sum, which is defined
next:
Given a universe of positive integers U = {s1, . . . , sn} and an integer K, determine
whether there exists a subset S ⊆ U that sums up to exactly K.
Given an input 〈U ,K〉 to Subset-Sum, we construct a market as follows. Let N = {1, . . . , n} be
the set of buyers and m = K the number of units. Set the budget of each buyer i to bi = si and
the value of i for j units of the good to:
vi(j) =
{
si if j ≥ si
0 if j < si
We show that a revenue of at least K can be obtained via an envy-free pricing in this market if
and only if the Subset-Sum problem has a solution.
Suppose there is a price p and allocation x such that (p,x) is envy-free and the revenue attained
is at least K. Since each buyer i gets an optimal bundle, we have: ui(xi, p) = vi(xi) − p · xi ≥ 0.
There are three cases:
1). xi = si. Then si − p · si ≥ 0, and so p ≤ 1.
2). xi < si. Then vi(xi) = 0, so ui(xi, p) = 0− p · xi ≥ 0, which means that either p = 0 or xi = 0.
Since p > 0 at any positive revenue, it must be that xi = 0.
3). xi > si. Then vi(xi) = si, so ui(xi, p) = si − p · xi ≥ 0, so p ≤ si/xi < 1. Since the revenue is
at least K and there are exactly K units, it cannot be that p < 1, and so this case can never
occur.
From cases (1 − 3) it follows that each buyer i gets either si or zero units and that the price
is at most 1. Since the revenue is at least K and attained from selling K units, we get that in
fact p = 1. Let I = {i ∈ N | xi > 0} be the set of buyers that get a non-zero allocation. Then
Rev(p,x) =
∑
i∈I xi · p =
∑
i∈I si = K, which implies that I is a solution to the Subset-Sum
problem.
For the other direction, let I be a solution to Subset-Sum. Set the price to p = 1 and the
allocation x to xi = si. It can be checked that (p,x) is an envy-free pricing with revenue exactly
K.
The reduction for social welfare is almost identical and exploits the fact that the equilibrium
price achieving the target social welfare must, again, be equal to 1 (if it exists). 
Theorem 15 Given a multi-unit market with general valuations, there exists an FPTAS for the
problem of computing a welfare or revenue maximizing envy-free price.
31
Proof: (sketch) The main idea is that for general valuations, the hardness no longer comes from
guessing the price—in fact we can freely iterate over the set of candidate prices and the optimal
solution is still guaranteed in this set for the same reason as that in the case of general valuations.
Rather, the hardness comes from selecting the set of buyers to be allocated at a given price.
Thus if we had a black box that produced an approximate solution efficiently for each fixed
price, then the problem would be solved. This black box will be the FPTAS for the 0-1 Multi-
Choice Knapsack Problem; there are several such algorithms, such as the one due to Lawler [?],
which for n items and precision ǫ > 0, runs in time O(n log 1/ǫ+ 1/ǫ4).
The 0-1 Multi-Choice Knapsack Problem is as follows:
We are given m classes C1, C2, . . . , Cm of items to pack in some knapsack of capacity
C. Each item j ∈ Ci has a value pi,j and a weight wi,j . The problem is to choose at
most one item from each class such that the value sum is maximized without the weight
sum exceeding C.
Then our algorithm for maximizing revenue or welfare in a market with general valuations is
as follows. For each price p ∈ P, where P is the set of candidate prices, construct a 0-1 Multi-
Choice Knapsack instance, such that the ith category contains an item for every quantity (i.e.
# of units) that can be sold to player i. That is, we create an element in category Ci for every
possible integer y ∈ {0, . . . ,m} with the property that player i’s utility is non-negative should he
be allocated exactly y units. Note that some numbers of units will be missing from Ci, exactly at
those sizes at which i’s utility would be negative.
• For the objective of maximizing revenue, set the weight of the item corresponding to y equal
to y and its value equal to p · y.
• For the objective of maximizing social welfare, set the weight of each item corresponding to
y equal to y and its value to vi,y.
Then set the total volume constraint to m and the total value (target k).
Then it can be seen that a value of K can be obtained in the 0-1 Multi-Choice Knapsack
problem if and only if a target revenue (or welfare respectively) of K can be obtained in the market.
Note that if a knapsack solution omits taking an element from some class Ci, we can obtain an
equivalent solution that is still feasible where the item with zero value and zero weight from class
Ci is included on top of all the other elements that are part of the solution.
Since we have an FPTAS for solving the 0-1 Multi-Choice Knapsack instance, we can just
this algorithm as a subroutine n×m times, which makes the total runtime still polynomial in the
market size and 1/ǫ. 
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